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Side-channel attacks leverage correlations between power consumption and intermediate encryption results to infer encryption keys. Recent studies show that deep learning offers promising results in the context of side-channel attacks. However, neural networks utilized in deep-learning side-channel attacks are complex with a substantial number of parameters and consume significant memory. As a result, it is challenging to perform deep-learning side-channel attacks on resource-constrained devices. In this paper, we propose a framework, TinyPower, which leverages pruning to reduce the number of neural network parameters for side-channel attacks. Pruned neural networks obtained from our framework can successfully run side-channel attacks with significantly fewer parameters and less memory. Specifically, we focus on structured pruning over filters of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs). We demonstrate the effectiveness of structured pruning over power and EM traces of AES-128 running on microcontrollers (AVR XMEGA and ARM STM32) and FPGAs (Xilinx Artix-7). Our experimental results show that we can achieve a reduction rate of 98.8% (e.g., reducing the number of parameters from 53.1 million to 0.59 million) on a CNN and still recover keys on XMEGA. For STM32 and Artix-7, we achieve a reduction rate of 92.9% and 87.3% on a CNN respectively. We also demonstrate that our pruned CNNs can effectively perform the attack phase of side-channel attacks on a Raspberry Pi 4 with less than 2.5 millisecond inference time per trace and less than 41 MB memory usage per CNN. 

We describe a fast, abstract method for reverse engineering (RE) field programmable gate array (FPGA) look-up-tables (LUTs). Our method has direct applications to hardware (HW) metering and FPGA fingerprinting, and our approach allows easy portability and application to most L UT based FPGAs. Unlike conventional RE methodologies that rely on vendor specific code (like Xilinx XDL), tools, configuration files, components, etc., our methodology is not dependent on any specific FPGA or FPGA computer aided design (CAD) tool. We use generic hardware description language (HDL) code based on specially connected CASE statements to program the L UTs on a target FPGA. Our specially connected CASE statements allow us to guide placement of L UT functions on successive synthesis runs. This enables us to quickly determine which bits in the FPGA 's configuration file match to FPGA L UT bits. After we know which bits are L UT bits, we can go further and match specific LUT bits to specific bits in the configuration file, thereby creating a one-to-one mapping between every L UT memory cell and its matching bit in the configuration file. In this paper we present our CASE statement functions for performing one-to-one mapping of all FPGA L UT memory cell bits to specific configuration file bits. We have successfully applied our methods to several 7000 series Xilinx and Intel (Altera) FPGAs. 

In recent decades, due to the emerging requirements of computation acceleration, cloud FPGAs have become popular in public clouds. Major cloud service providers, e.g. AWS and Microsoft Azure have provided FPGA computing resources in their infrastructure and have enabled users to design and deploy their own accelerators on these FPGAs. Multi-tenancy FPGAs, where multiple users can share the same FPGA fabric with certain types of isolation to improve resource efficiency, have already been proved feasible. However, this also raises security concerns. Various types of side-channel attacks targeting multi-tenancy FPGAs have been proposed and validated. The awareness of security vulnerabilities in the cloud has motivated cloud providers to take action to enhance the security of their cloud environments. In FPGA security research papers, researchers always perform attacks under the assumption that attackers successfully co-locate with victims and are aware of the existence of victims on the same FPGA board. However, the way to reach this point, i.e., how attack- ers secretly obtain information regarding accelerators on the same fabric, is constantly ignored despite the fact that it is non-trivial and important for attackers. In this paper, we present a novel finger- printing attack to gain the types of co-located FPGA accelerators. We utilize a seemingly non-malicious benchmark accelerator to sniff the communication link and collect performance traces of the FPGA-host communication link. By analyzing these traces, we are able to achieve high classification accuracy for fingerprinting co-located accelerators, which proves that attackers can use our method to perform cloud FPGA accelerator fingerprinting with a high success rate. As far as we know, this is the first paper targeting multi-tenant FPGA accelerator fingerprinting with the communica- tion side-channel. 

Reverse engineering (RE) is a widespread practice within engineering, and it is particularly relevant for discovering maliciousfunctionality in digital hardware components. In this paper, we discuss bitstream or firmware RE for field programable gate arrays (FPGAs). A bitstream establishes the configuration of the FPGA device fabric. Complete knowledge of both the physical device fabric and a specific bitstream should be sufficient to determine the complete configuration of the programmed FPGA. However, a significant challenge to bitstream RE arises because information about the FPGA fabric and interpretation of the bitstream is typically incomplete. The uncertainties limit the confidence in the correctness of any configuration determined through the RE process. This paper identifies representative sources of uncertainty in bitstream RE of FPGA devices.